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Present day computer algebra systems (CASs) and proof assistants (PAs) are specialized
programs that help humans with mathematical computations and deductions. Although
several such systems are impressive, they all have certain limitations. In most CASs side
conditions that are essential for the truth of an equality are not formulated; moreover
there are bugs. The PAs have a limited power for computing and hence also for assistance
with proofs. Almost all examples of both categories are stand alone special purpose
systems and therefore they cannot communicate with each other.
We will argue that the present state of the art in logic is such that there is a natural
formal language, independent of the special purpose application in question, by which
these systems can communicate mathematical statements. In this way their individual
power will be enhanced.
Statements received at one particular location from other sites fall into two categories:
with or without the qualification “evidently impeccable”, a notion that is methodologi-
cally precise and sound. For statements having this quality assessment the evidence may
come from the other site or from the local site itself, but in both cases it is verified
locally. In cases where there is no evidence of impeccability one has to rely on cross
checking. There is a trade-off between these two kinds of statements: for impeccability
one has to pay the price of obtaining less power.
Some examples of communication forms are given that show how the participants
benefit.
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1. Introduction
This paper is an introduction to the field of computer assisted mathematics in which
CASs and PAs interact, and is aimed at people who are not familiar with one of these
two topics. At the same time we have tried to make it interesting to people that are
familiar with one of these fields. This paper continues ideas presented in Cohen (2000)
and Barendregt (1997).
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current situation
In computer algebra systems a rich variety of abstract (but “computable”) mathemat-
ical objects can be represented. For example there are
algebraic numbers
√−5
polynomials x3 − 3x2 + 2x− 1
rational functions
x2 + 1
x3 − 3x2 + 2x− 1
integrals
∫
x2 + 1
x3 − 3x2 + 2x− 1dx,
∫
dx
3
√
1 + x6
permutations (1, 2)(4, 6, 8, 7)
matrices
(
x 1− x
7/x 0
)
and we can perform on these objects a large repertoire of computable operations. The
algorithms implemented in CASs are impressive in two ways: they rely on sophisticated
mathematics and they have a good efficiency performance.
PAs provide support in dealing with mathematical deduction. These systems range
from automated theorem provers to proof checkers. An automated theorem prover per-
forms a proof search once it is given a logic, an axiom system and a goal to be proved.
A proof checker on the other hand is given in addition a formalized putative proof and
then checks its correctness in the given situation. In some areas of mathematics—such
as elementary geometry—there are theorem provers that work well, but in general proof
search is not feasible. At the other end of the spectrum proof checking is a boring enter-
prise, since proofs have to be provided in full detail by a human. For these reasons many
PAs are situated somewhere in between the two extremes. These PAs are interactive: in
a dialogue with the human user the proof is constructed.
CASs and PAs are impressive in different ways. CASs can construct interesting math-
ematical objects which are difficult to obtain otherwise. At present the collaboration
between humans and PAs has not yet produced substantial new mathematical theories,
but the potential is there. The interest of PAs lies in the capacity to formalize large parts
of mathematics, including abstract non-computable objects and notions, obtaining a con-
siderably increased level of rigor. Moreover these systems are used for the verification of
small but essential pieces of software.
problems
Both the CASs and the PAs also have their problems. In CASs one usually does not
have a means to state side conditions needed for the validity of an equality. This can lead
to incorrect results presented by a CAS. And then there are bugs in CASs—as so often
is the case in big software systems—because of the high complexity of the underlying
mathematics and the optimization used for the performance.
In the present day PAs one has a less developed library of computable functions.
Since computations are also important for the proofs of theorems (we will give exam-
ples later), this is a limitation indeed. The reason for this underdevelopment is twofold.
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In the first place not all logical systems are very apt at representing computations. And
in the second place not much energy has been spent on the development of computable
functions in those systems in which this is possible. These two reasons have a common
origin. Computations are long “objects” (sequences of stepwise transformed expressions).
If such an object is subject to a proof of correctness, then that proof tends to be even
longer. We will pause a moment to sketch this tension between proofs and computa-
tions (or if you want between rigor and efficiency) for a period of over 2000 years
into the present. In Section 4 we will see how a suggestion of Poincare´, as imple-
mented in various type theories, is able to make a smooth interface between proving
and computing.
an abstract history of mathematics: computations vs. proofs
It is said that mathematics started at least 6000 years ago. What is meant by this
statement is that bones from that period have been found on which there are carvings,
indicating that a process of counting (in unary notation) took place. About 4000 years
ago Sumerian mathematics used numbers represented in a (sexagesimal, i.e. base 60) posi-
tional notation and the Babylonians were able to compute with these and solve quadratic
equations. Around 2500 years ago the Greeks made another quantum leap forward by
introducing reason and proofs. This culminated in the work of Euclid (300 B.C.), sum-
marizing large parts of then known mathematics in an axiomatic way. Although proofs
are still considered as the essence of mathematics because of the implied rigor, at first
they came at the price of not being able to handle computations well. For example in
Euclid one can find an equality like (x + y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2 explained in geomet-
rical terms, but never similar equations for (x + y)4, for obvious reasons. Archimedes
(287–212 B.C.) was an exception in his mastery of combining computations and proofs,
but after him it took a long time until the two activities of mathematics, computing and
reasoning, were fully integrated. One of the next steps came from the Persian mathemati-
cian al-Khwarizmi, who gave (around 825 A.D.) proofs that the elementary arithmetical
operations on the decimal positional system (as taught in our elementary school) are
indeed correct. But when Newton introduced in his Principia (1686) the calculus, he
went through quite some effort to formulate it in geometrical terms in order to achieve
the same rigor as Euclid. This difficulty did not hamper him in obtaining fine results.
But when in the eighteenth century English mathematicians continued in this fashion,
their progress was seriously hampered. In continental eighteenth century mathematics
computations became a powerful tool culminating in the work of Euler. Not all his for-
mal manipulations were correct, but Euler’s intuition was strong enough to be a guide
to what to accept and what not. It was only in the nineteenth century that a sufficiently
rigorous foundation was given for calculus by Cauchy, Weierstrass and others. Since that
period modern mathematics has flourished.
Once the foundations of calculus were satisfactory, one needed to deal and reason with
infinite objects. In order to obtain a sufficient ontology and logical foundation for this
purpose one had to wait untill the twentieth century, when formalisms such as set theory,
(higher order) logic or type theory became available. We will come back to this later.
Although the tension between computations and proofs ended in the nineteenth century
for the usual informal mathematics, the story continues since now parts of mathematics
are done with the help of computers.
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2. Computer Algebra Systems
expressiveness
In CASs, arithmetic with mathematical objects such as arbitrary length integers, poly-
nomials, transcendental functions, permutations, groups, differential operators, vectors
and matrices is standard. These systems work with expressions representing recursively
built up data types. For example, the following gives a possible abstract grammar for
expressions over a ring.
nzd := 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 non-zero digits
d := 0 | nzd digits
n := d | nzd n numerals
pv := x | y | z primitive variables
v := pv | pvn (general) variables
e := 0 | 1 | v | n e | e+e | e−e | e×e | en (ring) expressions
Typical examples of such expressions are x2+2xy+y2 and (x0x1x2x3+1)10. The first one
is built up as follows: x and y are primitive variables, hence variables, hence expressions;
but then x2, 2xy and y2 are also expressions and finally x2 + 2xy+ y2 is one too (we use
the associativity law to be implicit about how the sum is formed); the second expression
is built up similarly after we realize how the numeral 10 is constructed.
computational power
The standard arithmetical operations addition, subtraction, multiplication, and divi-
sion, on mathematical objects as described in the Introduction, are available whenever
defined. But many other operations are possible, ranging from simplification of expres-
sions, factorization of polynomials and integration of transcendental functions to finding
the reduced Gro¨bner basis of an ideal when given a set of generating polynomials for it.
The reader is referred to any of the following authors; Cohen and Sterk (1999), Adams
and Loustaunau (1994), Buchberger (1985), Buchberger and Winkler (1998), Cox and
O’Shea (1992) and Eisenbud (1995), for details on Gro¨bner bases.
efficiency
The size of objects that can be stored and the speed of standard arithmetic greatly
exceeds human capacity. For example, groups generated by permutations on thousands
of letters can be efficiently analyzed. Fast algorithms for factorization are still being
developed, enabling users to decompose rational univariate polynomials of degrees in
the hundreds. Solving a system of polynomials by means of Gro¨bner basis techniques
has become considerably more efficient over the last few years, but the extremely bad
complexity does not allow for any optimism in the size of systems that can indeed be
solved automatically.
reliability
CAS are not impeccable for two reasons. In the most commonly used systems, there
is no mention of side conditions. Thus, when asking for the integral
∫
xadx, you often
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receive as an answer 1a+1x
a+1, although this fails to hold for a = −1. The other reason
is simply the existence of bugs. For example, although clearly
1− 1
2 + e3piix
=
1 + e3piix
2 + e3piix
,
according to Maple V, release 4, the definite integral on the interval (0, 2) of the left-hand
side equals 2 while the same integral of the right-hand side equals 0.
3. Logic and Type Theory
Aristotle gave a good description of the axiomatic method. In mathematics there are
objects and properties. Objects are either defined (from other known objects) or primitive
objects. Properties can either be proved (from other established properties) or be assumed
axiomatically.
Computation deals with the manipulation of objects, proving with deriving proper-
ties. What should be emphasized is that definitions also play an important role in the
formulation of properties.
from informal to formal mathematics
First we will give a global view of the ways in which informal mathematical statements
can be formalized in logic and type theory.
informal mathematics
A typical statement in informal (i.e. the usual kind of) mathematics is the following.
Theorem. Given situation Γ. Then one has A.
The fact that mathematics is informal does not mean that it is imprecise, but that it
is open ended. The language in which it is formulated is informal, not given by a fixed
grammar. Since informality can go together with precision one speaks about informal
rigor. In spite of this it is customary in informal mathematics that the precision in the
formulation of the results is higher than in the proofs.
logic
In logic the statement in the above theorem becomes the following assertion.
Γ ` A (1)
stating that from the assumptions Γ the statement A is provable. The statements Γ, A
are formalized, but not always the proof†.
The simplest logic that is adequate for reasonable parts of mathematics is first-order
logic. Here one considers a domain of objects in which one is interested and quantification
(“for all”, “there exists”) ranges over this domain.
†One often relies on informally proved metamathematical results; for example in predicate logic with
equality one has a = b ⇒ C[a] = C[b], for all contexts C[ ]. Although this can be derived for each
instance of C[ ] from the equality axioms, one does not do so, because such derivations become lengthy.
Rather one informally proves the general statement by induction on the structure of C[ ] in the metalevel.
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A reasonable amount of geometry or number theory can be developed in the axioma-
tizations of these theories in first-order logic (e.g. by Hilbert and Peano). More profound
results are obtained by making connections with notions from other parts of mathemat-
ics, for example by studying geometric structures in the context of groups. If the other
parts of mathematics can be formalized within first-order logic, then the richer theory
can be formalized best by using many-sorted (first-order) logic (L1). In this framework
one considers several domains of objects (with quantification over one of these). A prime
example is the theory describing vector spaces in which there is a domain for scalars and
one for vectors.
But some theories cannot be formalized in a straightforward way within first-order
logic. An example of the other way to obtain more profound results is to apply analytical
methods to arithmetic (for example obtaining results about primes). For this one needs
to work in a framework that is stronger than first-order logic. There are (at least) two
different means by which to do this. The first one is the program of Bourbaki that
formulates mathematics in set theory (ST), which on the one hand is a theory strong
enough to do this and on the other hand capable of being formalized within first-order
logic. (The many-sortedness is automatic, as we can describe many different universes
(structures) within set theory.) In this way (1) is replaced by
ΓST ,Γ `L1 A.
The second way is to use second- or higher-order (many-sorted) logic in which many
mathematical notions can be defined. The difference with first-order logic is that now
quantification may range over subsets of the domains (second-order logic; L2) or families
of subsets of the domains (third-order logic; L3), etc. until higher-order logic (Lω, the
union of the Ln). Now (1) is replaced by
Γ `L2 A, Γ `L3 A, . . . or Γ `Lω A,
depending on the logical strength that is needed. (Some authors have a different way of
counting this hierarchy.)
There is still one aspect of mathematics that is not covered by the logical machinery
so far. Suppose we tell you that for $10 we can give you a machine that when turned on
within 1 second answers “yes” if and only if the Riemann hypothesis is true and answers
“no” otherwise. Then you may be willing to risk your $10 and ask for the machine.
What we do is that we give you two machines: one that always answers “yes” within
1 second and another one that always answers “no”. We reason that if the Riemann
hypothesis is true, then the first machine is the right one, and if it is false, then the
second machine is. But in any case we fulfilled our promise: we gave you a machine with
the right performance. Those of you that find this a cheat are right. But this is exactly
what Brouwer meant by his rejection of the general principle of the excluded middle.
Another way of seeing his point is that there are predicates A(x) in Peano arithmetic
(PA) such that one has ΓPA ` ∃x.A(x) but
ΓPA 6` A(0), ΓPA 6` A(1), ΓPA 6` A(2), . . . .
This means that one can prove that a certain natural number exists, without being able
to find a witness.
It may seem that if mathematics is based on intuitionistic rather than classical logic
one can prove much less. Among others Go¨del pointed out that one can have another
view. By making the following “double negation translation” that essentially replaces
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atomic formulas by their double negation and disjunctions and existential formulas by
their so-called weak versions
A ∨o B ≡ ¬(¬A&¬B)
∃ox.A ≡ ¬∀x.¬A
a classical mathematician does not notice anything, while now one can prove A ∨o ¬A
within intuitionistic logic. In fact provability based on intuitionistic logic is stronger: now
one can for example express strong existence ∃x.Ax, which is such that if it is provable,
then one always can find a witness n such that An is provable. Or if one proves A ∨ B,
then one can find out a proof of one of the two.
type theory
Type theory goes one step further by formalizing the proofs as well. Our abstract
assertion now becomes the following.
Γ ` p : A (2)
stating that p is the proof of A from Γ, where now not only Γ and A are in a formal
language, but the proof p is as well.
Aristotle remarked that if someone gave him a putative proof, then he would be able to
verify that it is indeed a proof. On the other hand, if someone gave him a putative theorem
without a proof, then he would not always be able to verify its correctness. These remarks
are the essential intuition behind the twentieth century (metamathematical) propositions
that the assertion (2) is decidable (Go¨del), while (1) is not (Turing).
A more precise reason why proof checking is decidable is the fact that for the usual
systems of type theory one has as a first approximation that
Γ ` p : A ⇔ typeΓ(p) = A, (3)
where typeΓ is a relatively simple computable function. Hence (2) is decidable and one
does not need to store the “meta”-proof asserting that Γ ` p : A. We come back to this
later, see (14) below.
The decidability of (2) is the essence of why arbitrary mathematical notions, such as
a Hilbert space H, can be represented exactly on a computer. In CASs an object like √3
can be represented exactly, because we just write it down as a symbol and we know how
to manipulate it:
(
√
3)2 + 1 = 4,
but
√
3 + 1 cannot be rewritten. In PAs arbitrary mathematical notions are similarly
written down, but now we also have to store the proofs (or the information that there
are proofs) of the more complex properties about them. For example of the property (for
H a topological Hausdorff vector space over R or C)
H is locally compact ⇔ H is finite dimensional.
In the transition from logic to type theory the three aspects that make it possible to
express mathematics (many-sortedness, higher-order, constructive disjunction and exis-
tence) are incorporated in a natural way. We will now give examples of how mathematical
statements can be expressed using higher-order logic and type theory, without having
to rely on set theory. For a description of higher-order logic see Schu¨tte (1960); for type
theory see Martin-Lo¨f (1984) and Barendregt and Geuvers (2001).
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expressiveness
Let R = 〈R,+,−,×, 1, 0〉 be a ring. In Section 1 we defined the syntactic category of
expressions over R. We can now define the first-order formulas over this structure.
a := e=e atomic formulas
f := a | ¬f | f&f | f∨f | f⇒f | ∀vf | ∃vf (first-order) formulas.
The quantifiers ∀,∃ are intended to range over R. One can state that R is a commutative
ring by the set of the following eight formulas Γ.
∀x x+ 0 = x
∀x, y x+ y = y + x
∀x, y, z (x+ y) + z = x+ (y + z)
∀x x+ (−x) = 0
∀x 1x = x
∀x, y xy = yx
∀x, y, z (xy)z = x(yz)
∀x, y, z x(y + z) = xy + xz.
Usually the outer quantifiers ∀ are not written. The assertion
Γ ` (x+ y)2 = x2 + 2xy + y2
states that from Γ one can prove the equation, where of course e2 = ee and 2e abbreviate
ee and e+ e respectively. Similarly the assertion
Γ,∀x, y (xy = 0 ⇒ (x = 0 ∨ y = 0)) ` ∀x (4x = 0 ⇒ 2x = 0),
stating that in a commutative ring without zero divisors one has that 4x = 0 implies
2x = 0. We have not given the deduction and equality rules that are needed to prove
such statements. A small number of these rules will do.
In type theory types serve as different domains for mathematical entities. For example
in the theory of vector spaces one needs to distinguish between scalars and vectors;
in elementary synthetic projective geometry one has points and lines. Types and their
function spaces can also be used to express properties.
A unary property on R can be expressed by introducing a predicate P1 : R→Prop.
A binary predicate has type P2 : R→R→Prop. The notion of atomic formulas is now
extended such that P1(e) and P2(e,e) are also included among them.
One can state as follows that a unary I : R→Prop, thought of as set, is an ideal.
ideal(I) ::= I(0) & ∀x, y:R.[I(x) & I(y)→I(x− y)] &
∀x, r:R.[I(x)→I(rx)]
Properties of binary predicates can be expressed just as easily (instead of ∼(x, y) one
writes x ∼ y).
antisymmetric(∼) ::= ∀x, y [x ∼ y → y 6∼ x];
irreflexive(∼) ::= ∀x x 6∼ x.
In second-order logic there are quantifiers over predicates over R. For example, here is
how to express that an element of R has torsion.
torsion(x) ::= ∀P :(R→Prop) [P (x) & ∀y:R(P (y)→P (y + x))→P (0)].
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This states that 0 belongs to all sets containing x that are closed under adding x, in
particular in {x, x+ x, x+ x+ x, . . .}.
Using type theory (with inductive types) this can be expressed more naturally (and
one does not even need the second-order quantification).
Nat ::= zero | suc Nat (4)
zero x ::= 0 (5)
(suc n)x ::= nx+ x (6)
torsion(x) ::= ∃n:Nat.n x = 0. (7)
Equation (4) defines the type of natural numbers as generated freely from a constant
zero and a unary operation suc(cessor). Equations (5) and (6) define the multiplication
of an element of Nat with an element of R. Finally, (7) gives the more natural definition
of having torsion.
A proper use of second-order quantification (both in logic and type theory) is to express
that R is Noetherian, i.e. every non-increasing (better: weakly descending) sequence of
ideals has a fixed point:
∀I:(Nat→(R→Prop)).
[[∀n:Nat.I(n+ 1) ⊆ I(n)]→
[∀n:Nat.ideal(I(n))]→
∃m.I(m) = I(m+ 1)].
Here, for X,Y : R→Prop one defines
X ⊆ Y ↔ ∀r:R.X(r)→Y (r);
X = Y ⇔ ∀r:R.X(r)↔ Y (r).
The reason that the notion Noetherian ring is stated in second-order logic is that
∀I:(Nat→(R→Prop)) does not quantify over a type representing ordinary elements, but
over a type representing functions. Note that quantifying over Nat→(R→Prop) essen-
tially is the same as over Nat × R→Prop and hence over P(Nat × R), the collection of
subsets of Nat×R. This is second-order quantification.
Higher-order quantification (both in logic and type theory) can express, for example,
that there is a topology on R and that a function f : R→R is continuous with respect
to this topology.
∃O:((R→Prop)→Prop)
[O(∅) & O(R) &
∀O1, O2:(R→Prop)[O(O1) & O(O2)→O(O1 ∩O2)] &
∀I:Set∀O:(I→(R→Prop))[[∀i:I O(O(i))]→O(⋃i:I O(i))]
&
∀O:R→Prop O(O)→O(f−1(O))].
Here, one has ∅, R,⋃i:I O(i), f−1(O) : R→Prop defined as usual:
∅(x) ::= False;
R(x) ::= True;
(
⋃
i:IO(i))(x) ::= ∃i:I O(i)(x);
(f−1(O))(x) ::= O(f(x)).
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The quantification over ((R→Prop)→Prop) is really the same as over P(P(R)), which is
third order.
In this way most mathematical statements can be formulated smoothly in higher-
order logic and type theory. (Statements in finite combinatorics are sometimes hard to
formulate—even more so to prove—in type theory, because they rely on intuition. Take
for example the combinatorial theorem: It is impossible to give a disjoint subdivision of
a cube into finitely many smaller ones of unequal size. This result has a proof with a
simple geometric intuition which is hard to catch formally. See also Jamnik (1997).)
deductive power
In the usual logical systems deductive power comes in conjunction with expressive
power. This means that if there are first- (or higher)- order quantifiers in the language,
then there are also deduction rules that govern these. This means that then one is able
to prove the “valid” sentences involving these quantifiers. In principle matters can be
separated: adding quantifiers as a means of expression and adding the quantifier rules
as a means of assertion. Apart from some technical matters concerning substitution the
rules for quantification are not hard. For example, for universal quantification the rules
are as follows.
Γ ` ∀x:D.Ax Γ ` d : D
Γ ` Ad
Γ, x:D ` Ax
Γ ` ∀x:D.Ax.
Here, D is to be interpreted as a set and d : D as d ∈ D. The first rule was already
used by Aristotle.
In type theory, where proofs become explicit, these rules become as follows.
Γ ` p : ∀x:D.Ax Γ ` d : D
Γ ` pd : Ad
Γ, x:D ` q : Ax
Γ ` λx:D.q : ∀x:D.Ax.
The intuition is that p is a proof of the universal statement ∀x:D.Ax because it is a
function such that for all d ∈ D the value pd(= p(d) in more traditional notation) is a
proof of Ad. The expression λx:D.q denotes the function that assigns to x ∈ D the value
q (that may depend on x). For a precise description of some type theoretic systems used
in type checking, see Barendregt and Geuvers (2001). This way of handling proofs and
their rules causes the logic formalized by type theory to be intuitionistic. We will make
use of this in Section 5.
Type theory as a medium to formalize proof for proof checking was initiated by de
Bruijn in the 1960s, see Nederpelt et al. (1994) for an overview. In Martin-Lo¨f (1984)
emphasis has been put on special kinds of type theory with a predicative (read: reliable)
semantics.
4. Proof Assistants
A proof assistant is a computer program that allows a user to formulate and input an
axiomatic theory as well as definitions and statements in the language of that theory.
The assistant then checks whether the input is mathematically well formed. In addition,
the user can propose a statement as the goal (to be proved) and the assistant then
helps to construct a proof. The assistance offered for finding a proof ranges from none
(in a pure proof checker) to everything (in a theorem prover, only possible for restricted
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mathematical areas such as Euclidean geometry), with in between an interactive proof
development system.
reliability
One may wonder whether a proof constructed partially or totally by a computer is
reliable. Indeed, software is complex and hence it is hard to avoid errors. There is, how-
ever, a satisfactory methodology that warrants correctness of statements to the highest
degree of certainty. A proof should be in such a format that in order to check it, one
needs only to check whether each step is correct according to a small number of axioms
and deduction rules. The proof may be large, so that the checking takes time, but the
software that performs the checking consists of a small program. This program then has
to be verified “by hand” and one obtains a reliable system, even if the proof development
part of the assistant is large (and hence error prone). As a result one has proof assistants
of the following general architecture producing statements with the highest degree of
certainty. Such statements are said to be “evidently impeccable”, the evidence coming
from the proof object.
proof-development system
proof-
checker
proof-
object
certified
statement
tactics
current context
current goal
proof assistant
In the picture the notion “proof object” refers to the fully formalized proof that is either
stored or ephemeral and can be used in order to ensure that the checking is reliable. The
expression “tactics” refers to the commands that the user has to give to help build the
proof in an interactive way.
A proof assistant satisfies the de Bruijn criterion if it has a proof checker that is
small enough to be verified by hand. Proof assistants that have proof objects that are
stored have the advantage of the possibility of independent checking. This means that
the proof object can be sent to another site where it is checked by a locally trusted
proof checker. Additionally, proof objects are useful, because from them one may extract
certified algorithms in an automated way. These extracted algorithms can be surprisingly
efficient, in fact more efficient than the original handmade ones.
computations and proofs
Computations are frequently used in mathematics in order to obtain answers to nu-
merical problems. Proofs have been used in order to warrant properties. An important
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spin-off is the possibility of making substantial shortcuts in computations while being
sure that the same outcome is obtained.
There are also symbolic computations. These help by making shortcuts not only in
other computations (e.g. numerical ones) but also in proofs. We give some short examples
of computations useful in proofs.
(1) Let An = (..((true→ q)→q) . . .→q︸ ︷︷ ︸
n× q
), where q is some propositional variable. In order
to define An, write
A0 = true;
An+1 = An → q.
The goal is to show ` A2000. This can be done by first proving ∀k [(A2k ↔
true) & (A2k+1 ↔ q)]. Then the goal follows from the computation that 2000 =
2 ∗ 1000.
(2) In order to show that in a ring one has
∀x (x3 + x2 + x+ 1)(x− 1) = x4 − 1,
a simple but essential symbolic computation is needed.
(3) For an n× n matrix A over Q one has
A is invertible ⇔ det(A) 6= 0.
This is a clear transformation of a property into a computation.
Since computing is important for proving, one would like that if f is a computable
function (on a freely generated algebra A), then there is a formal expression F (x) such
that for all a, b ∈ A
f(a) = b ⇔ ` F (a) = b, (8)
for some representation a 7→ a of elements of A in the theory.
efficiency
The most efficient way (from the point of proving) to ensure (8) is to add for each
computable function f an expression F (x) and postulate axiomatically that for arbitrary
a ∈ A
` F (a) = f(a). (9)
This is what is called in Barendregt (1997) the Poincare´ Principle. In Poincare´ (1902) it
is argued that if 2 + 2 = 4 is needed in a mathematical argument, then this part is not
so much a proof in the strict sense of the word, but a “mere verification”. Adding (9) as
an axiom is possible, even if we want proof checking to be decidable. (For this reason it
was required that the function f be computable.) A particular way to ensure that (9) is
automatically derivable is to take as deduction rule (in type theory)
Γ ` p : A(F (a))
Γ ` p : A(f(a)) (10)
(a similar rule for logic is obtained by leaving out “p :” twice). In type theory with
proof objects this is quite efficient, since the p does not need to be changed in order to
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acknowledge the equality. Equation (9) is then derived as follows.
Γ ` refl : F (a) = F (a)
Γ ` refl : F (a) = f(a) ,
by taking A(x) ≡ (F (a) = x) in (10). Here, “refl” is a proof of the reflexivity of equality.
A useful way in which (10) is incorporated in modern PAs is the following.
Γ ` p : A(t)
Γ ` p : A(t′) t =R t
′, (11)
where the equality t =R t′ is given by some term rewriting system (TRS) R, see Klop
(1992), and can be decided externally. In this way one has, for example, that
Γ ` p : A((x3 + x2 + x+ 1)(x− 1))
Γ ` p : A(x4 − 1)
by employing (11) for the rewriting relation “expand” for ring expressions.
If (11) is added to type theory, then type (and hence proof) checking becomes
Γ ` p : A⇔ typeΓ(p) =R A. (12)
But then the de Bruijn criterion (having a simple proof checker that can be verified by
hand) is seriously impaired, because verifying whether =R holds between two expressions
may need a complex algorithm. The same is true if one of the other forms of the Poincare´
Principle (8), (9), (10) or (11) is added as a deduction rule. Therefore these forms of the
Poincare´ Principle are in conflict with the de Bruijn criterion. Another disadvantage of
rule (11) is that we would also like to use term rewriting for operations that do not
preserve equality. For example
x3 →dif 3x2
is a way of implementing derivation in CASs; such an algorithm we would like to have
as well in PAs.
Both problems have a methodologically elegant solution by considering (11) only for
some specific rewrite relations β, δ, ι:
Γ ` p : A(t)
Γ ` p : A(t′) t =βδι t
′. (13)
Here, =β is the rewrite rule of the lambda calculus:
(λx.t)s→β t[x := s],
where [x := s] denotes substitution of the expression s for the (proper) occurrences of
the variable x. These rewrite systems allow arbitrary manipulations with formulas.
The rewrite relation δ is related to definitions. Without these, statements become
too complex to be formulated and to be proved. Definitions are abbreviations, to be
unfolded, whenever needed, to what they stand for. The rewrite equality =δ is used to
expand definitions, for example
coshx→δ e
x + e−x
2
.
Finally, the rewrite equality =ι is used to implement primitive recursion:
fac(0)→ι 1
fac(x+ 1)→ι (x+ 1) ∗ fac(x)
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for the factorial function fac(x) = x! or
mirror(•)→ι •
mirror([t, s])→ι [mirror(s),mirror(t)]
for the function that mirrors binary trees with •’s at the leaves.
Having the tools of βδι-reductions makes it possible to replace rewrite operations such
as
x3 →dif 3x2
with
Fdif(x
3)→βδι 3x2,
thereby replacing the “special purpose machine”→dif by the more “universal machine”†→βδι and “software” Fdif.
One advantage of this transition is that in order to ensure the reliability of the proof
checker, one only has to verify the implementation of =βδι once, thereby not diverging
much from the original de Bruijn criterion. Indeed, proof and type checking become
Γ ` p : A⇔ typeΓ(p) =βδι A. (14)
The second “advantage”‡ is that now (functional) programs, e.g. for integration and
simplification, have to be explicitly provided. Once we have these programs in our formal
language, one has a handle to state and prove required properties. In Jackson (1995) one
can find many uses of this methodology. In Armando et al. (1999), some support is given
towards the synthesis of such programs.
A different approach is taken in the PAs HOL, see Harrison (1996), and Isabelle (2001).
In these systems one does not adopt the Poincare´ Principle, but produces “non-standard”
proof objects. These contain all information to be unfolded to a complete proof object
(including traces of computation); because these are rather large, this process happens
over time. The advantage is increased space efficiency; the disadvantage is that there are
no proof objects at one moment in time that can be manipulated (for example to be
modified or to extract algorithms from them).
5. Forms of Communication
The communication between CASs and PAs is somewhat asymmetric. CASs have an
essentially less rich (although at present more developed) language than PAs. CASs deal
with mathematical objects and (computable) ways to manipulate these. PAs on the other
hand also deal next to these with (possibly) non-computable properties of these objects.
And the richer PAs based on type theories also incorporate the manipulations on objects
and their properties (specifications) as standard objects.
†The expression “universal machine” was put in quotes because =βδι does not provide a computation
model for all computable functions. Wanting to improve on this one can add Y -reduction for fixed-point
recursion. If this is done proof checking is no longer decidable, but semi-decidable: sometimes one has
to possibly wait an infinitely long time. This is the price one pays for universality. But if the verification
process halts, then one is sure to have reached a proof that can also be reached without the Y -reduction
and hence is reliable, see Geuvers et al. (1999).
‡This advantage is real, but laborious: one has to give correctness proofs for many algorithms. Therefore
in the industrially used proof assistant PVS one essentially uses deduction rule (10) for a considerable
library of useful functions. Although as a result the system PVS itself is not impeccable, its use makes
it possible to obtain a substantial reduction of bugs in industrial software.
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Suppose that in a given mathematical situation we want to prove a goal for which
some computation is needed. We can represent this as the following query in logic
Γ ` A(a, ?) (15)
and in type theory
Γ ` ?? : A(a, ?). (16)
kIndeed, we not only want the data b on a data domain such that Γ ` A(a, b), but also a
proof of this fact. A typical example of such a situation is that there is a function f on
D such that for all a, b ∈ D one has
f(a) = b⇔ Γ ` A(a, b).
This is a situation in which PAs and CASs can fruitfully collaborate. There are several
ways in which this can be done. We describe these from the point of view of the PAs.
autarkic
At this level, the PA acts as an independent “autarkic” entity: it finds the b by an
internal function F and the proof by an internal proof generator pg:
Γ ` pg a : A(a, Fa).
This is a reasonable situation: the value b and the required correctness proof can be found
in a reliable way. However, the construction of F and pg may be hard. Moreover, the
evaluation of Fa to b may be of a high complexity. Since PAs are (at the current state
of the art) no champions in evaluation, one may want to follow a different strategy.
But before doing so, we discuss one of the more spectacular examples in terms of for-
malized computer algebra: the Buchberger algorithm. It is implemented in most standard
general purpose CASs (e.g. Maple, Mathematica, MuPAD, Reduce, Singular). When
given a finite set B of elements of a polynomial ring R over a field (allowing for com-
putable arithmetic as described in Section 2), it produces a finite set P of generators
of the ideal BR generated by B with the property that, by means of a simple rewrite
procedure in R, for each a ∈ R, a unique representative of the class a+BR containing a
can be computed. The finite set P is usually called a Gro¨bner basis of BR, its computa-
tion can be carried out by the Buchberger algorithm. The Gro¨bner basis depends on the
choice of an ordering on the monomials in R satisfying certain technical properties; such
orderings are referred to as a reduction ordering. Although the Buchberger algorithm has
been around since 1965, it has only recently been established by an autarkic PA: in The´ry
(1998) a Buchberger algorithm in a PA together with a correctness proof is constructed.
Let us consider a specific instance.
Claim. Suppose we are given the ring R = Q[x, y]. Define the lexicographic reduction
ordering on R with x > y. Consider the ideal I = {x2y − 1, xy2 − 1}R. Then P :=
{x− y, y3 − 1} is a Gro¨bner basis of I.
Here we have an example of the technological use of intuitionistic logic. In classical
mathematics one can state the following.
Theorem. For each ideal I in R there is a Gro¨bner basis P of I.
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The fact that P depends on I in a computable way cannot be expressed very well in the
traditional Bourbaki style of formalizing mathematics in set theory. One can only state
this via a formalization of Turing machines, but this is very awkward. For the computable
dependency it is not sufficient to state:
There is a Turing machine TM such that for every ideal I in R generated by
r1, . . . , rn ∈ R the result TM({r1, . . . , rn}) = P is a Gro¨bner basis of I.
This is because using classical logic the existence claim “There exists” does not need
to have a witness! The only way to state that there is a computable dependency is to
actually fully describe the Turing machine TM and state:
For each ideal I in R generated by r1, . . . , rn ∈ R the result TM({r1, . . . , rn}) =
P is a Gro¨bner basis of I.
It is completely unnatural to require the description of a Turing machine (or even a
program in a higher level computational model) in the formulation of a mathematical
statement. In formalizations using type theory, with its intuitionistic logic statement (5)
implies that one has an algorithm. (And the proof in The´ry (1998) does in fact have
the obligation to exhibit a form of the Buchberger algorithm.) If one wants to state (5)
without claiming that the dependency is computable, then one should replace ∃P by the
weak existence discussed before.
Theorem. ∀I ⊆ R[I is an ideal ⇒ ¬∀P¬ [P is a Gro¨bner basis for I]].
For example the classical statement,
Theorem. Every principal ideal domain is a unique factorization domain
has to be formalized in this way.
skeptical
Now the PA accepts the superiority of the CAS and asks for a given a the value of b. But
the PA does this in a skeptical way, it wants to have a warranty. There are several ways
in which this can be done. The first approach gives the PA some self esteem: besides the
output b the CAS also produces a witness c (= ca) that is such that the PA can employ
a proof generator pg using this witness:
Γ ` pg a ca : A(a, ba).
Of course the ba and ca depend on the a, but that is the responsibility of the CAS, the
PA has no power here. By way of an example, consider the following assertion.
Claim. gcd(14, 30) = 2.
Here we use the following lemma, which can be formally proved.
Lemma. For all m,n, d ∈ N we have
gcd(m,n) = d⇔ ∃x, y ∈ Z [xm+ yn = d & d |m & d |n].
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When a skeptical PA presents a CAS with the query “gcd(22,30) = ?”, then the CAS
might answer “2, witness x = −4, y = 3”. This is done using the so-called “extended
gcd” algorithm. (For the Gro¨bner basis algorithms there are similar extended versions.)
The PA then checks −4 · 22 + 3 · 30 = 2, 2|22 and 2|30 and the lemma can be applied.
(For the divisibility some help in the form of a witness may also be given.)
There are also algorithms that do not need to produce witnesses at all (next to the
output). Classical examples are factorization of integers and indefinite integration of
elementary functions; these are based on the availability of “proven” algorithms for the
verification, namely multiplication of integers and differentiation of elementary functions.
An experiment has been carried out, providing full proofs of the primality of (relatively)
large primes using the Pocklington criterion (based on Fermat’s little theorem). The
CASs provide witnesses; among these there is a sequence of smaller primes to which the
method is applied recursively. In this way the proof assistant Coq and the computer
algebra system GAP have collaborated and fully verified that
1111111111111111111 is prime;
9026258083384996860449366072142307801963 is prime.
See Caprotti and Oostdijk (2001) for details. The primes can be found on the web page of
Honaker (2000). The correctness of these statements cannot be proved by Coq or found
out to hold by GAP alone.
There is a variant of this method in which the witnesses are bigger. It may be the case
that the witness is not a simple value in D but a bigger expression Ca. Then one has the
situation
Γ ` pg a Ca : A(a, ba).
The PA still has the responsibility to do some computation.
Problem. Given two square matrices A, B over Qn, determine whether they are con-
jugate.
When presented with two matrices A and B, the CAS may answer “Yes, via the in-
vertible matrix C.” or “No, since there are invertible matrices C, D such that CAC−1
and DBD−1 have different Jordan blocks.” The PA will then be able to complete its
homework, which involves the verification that B = CAC−1 in the former case and that
CAC−1 and DBD−1 are both in Jordan normal form but are distinct matrices in the
second case.
At the other end of the scale the CAS comes up with both the output b and the
proof pa:
Γ ` pa : A(a, ba).
An example of this “worse” case skeptical interaction is Todd–Coxeter coset enumeration.
It is implemented in the two CASs GAP and MAGMA which are specially equipped for
group theory. See Cohen and Sterk (1999) for an introduction to the algorithm, which is
really a semi-algorithm in the sense that it does not need to terminate. Given a group
G in terms of generators and relations, and a subgroup H of G in terms of generators,
which are words in the generators of G, it constructs the cosets Hg with g ∈ G, if the
number of cosets is finite.
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Define
G := free group on a, b, c, d modulo the relators
a2, b2, c2, d2, (ab)3, (dc)3, (ca)3, (cb)4,
(cbab)4, (abc)7, (ad)2, (bd)2.
H := 〈a, b, c〉.
The algorithm will list H, Hd, Hda = Had = Hd, . . .. On the above input, the
computer algebra program GAP finds exactly 15 360 cosets. All identifications of cosets
can be certified by relations found during the coset enumeration. Some analysis of the
output shows that the group G has a normal subgroup N of order 27 with quotient
isomorphic to the alternating group on eight letters. But the only way to guarantee that
there is no bigger group; that is, that there are indeed no more than 15 360 cosets, is to
“trace” the algorithm: to feed each step of the execution of the algorithm into a proof.
Clearly, this is a most undesirable situation. We have come to the other extreme of the
so-called skeptic approach: in principle (and sometimes never in practice), there is a way
of supplying credence to the answer.
As we will see, there are even cases in which complexity of proof checking forces the
PA to be an obedient pupil in the traditional sense.
believing
From time to time a PA just has to believe a result from a CAS. This can be repre-
sented by
Γ ` axiom : A(a, ba),
stating that A(a, ba) is believed axiomatically. In science and engineering such a situation
often happens, for mathematics it is relatively new.
An example of a situation in which mathematical software cannot come up with any-
thing formal but the answer is the following.
Problem. Does there exist a projective plane of order 10?
Assisted by a special purpose CAS one is given the answer “No”. An exhaustive computer
search has not found a projective plane of order 10, see Lam (1991). For the sake of
argument, we refer to the intelligent software used here as a special purpose CAS. Since
the search required all available machine power, no trace could be left as a witness to
the conclusion that there is no projective plane of order 10. As a matter of fact, this
observation does not do real credit to the authors. They have given lots of indications of
how the search is conducted, how internal cross checks were run, and which configurations
were considered.
A different category of statements for which one needs to believe is related to the
algorithms that establish up to a probability of almost 100% that something holds, e.g.
that a number p is prime, see Ribenboim (2000). Actually such statements can be quite
reliable. In any case they can be used in combination with other statements for which
there is no proof at all and one relies on the authority of a CAS.
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6. Conclusions
In principle, PAs have the potential to become autarkic tools to help a human develop
mathematical theories in an evidently impeccable way. Because CASs are† more efficient
in computing, collaboration between PAs and CASs is profitable. The PAs are good for
reliability and the CASs for efficiency. Several forms of collaboration are possible with
varying trade-offs between reliability vs. efficiency.
For the communication one will need to make use of several techniques.
(1) A common language. The emerging standard OpenMath, see Caprotti and Cohen
(2001), can be used to carry statements of CASs and PAs. A good language to pro-
duce OpenMath documents with semantically rich mathematical objects is OMDoc
described in Kohlhase (2000a,b).
(2) Adding the possibility of making standardized queries to the PAs. For example
Γ ` ?? : A?.
(3) Agent technology in order to communicate queries and answers; these are the web
counterparts for input and output between PAs and CASs, see Armando et al.
(2000).
Using PAs in the autarkic or skeptical way produces evidently impeccable results. It
may be the case that statements obtained by theorem provers not satisfying the de
Bruijn principle are also impeccable. But probably the most cost effective way to obtain
impeccability is to take care that there is evidence, i.e. to rely on the methodology of
proof checking.
For the information given by a CASs it would be useful to have, next to the usual
complexity analysis of mathematical algorithms, a convincibility analysis. The goal of
this analysis is to express to what extent a CAS, when communicating across the Web
(or with a PA), is capable of providing evidence that the answer given to a query is
impeccable.
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